Following Vartiainen (2007) we consider bargaining problems in which no exogenous disagreement outcome is given. A bargaining solution assigns a pair of outcomes to such a problem, namely a compromise outcome and a disagreement outcome: the disagreement outcome may serve as a reference point for the compromise outcome, but other interpretations are given as well. For this framework we propose and study an extension of the classical Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution. We identify the (large) domain on which this solution is single-valued, and present two axiomatic characterizations on subsets of this domain.
Introduction
In the bargaining problem of Nash (1950) each player can unilaterally enforce the disagreement outcome if negotiations fail. In some cases, however, it may not be clear what the disagreement outcome is or whether the players can, or want to, enforce it if agreement is not reached. In the classical example of employer-union wage negotiations the union can call out a strike if it is not satisfied with the wage offered by the employer. But how long should the strike last? What will be its consequences? Will all workers join? Are there perhaps different and better ways to put pressure on management? Also, which outcome can the employer enforce, if any, in case no agreement is reached?
In this paper, following Vartiainen (2007) , we assume that the disagreement outcome is determined endogenously, namely by the bargaining solution. Specifically, the bargaining solution assigns a pair of outcomes, namely a compromise outcome and a disagreement outcome. The possible interpretations of such a bargaining solution are parallel to the usual interpretations of a classical bargaining solution in the situation where the disagreement outcome is exogenous. From a positive point of view, a classical bargaining solution predicts or describes the compromise outcome, i.e., it tells us what this outcome is given that the players reach agreement. From this point of view, a bargaining solution in the situation without exogenous disagreement outcome predicts both the compromise outcome for the case that the players reach an agreement, and the disagreement outcome in the opposite case. From a normative point of view, a classical bargaining solution functions like an outside arbitrator and proposes a compromise outcome, but this outcome should be 'reasonable' given the exogenous disagreement outcome. In the situation without exogenous disagreement outcome, a bargaining solution proposes a compromise as well as a disagreement outcome, such that the compromise is 'reasonable' when compared to the disagreement outcome. We will refine and detail these interpretations in Section 2 below.
Within this framework, Vartiainen (2007) proposes and axiomatically characterizes a bargaining solution which extends the classical Nash bargaining solution for bargaining problems with fixed, exogenous disagreement point. That solution maximizes the Nash product, i.e., the product of the gains of the players from the compromise outcome over the disagreement outcome.
By contrast, the solution proposed in our paper depends explicitly on the utopia point and extends the solution of Raiffa (1953) and Kalai-Smorodinsky (1975) for classical bargaining problems. This extension works as follows. First, the assigned compromise point is indeed the classical Kalai-Smorodinsky (KS) outcome for the assigned disagreement outcome. That is, it is the Pareto optimal point on the straight line joining this disagreement outcome and its associated utopia point. Second, the assigned disagreement outcome is the point on the straight line joining the assigned compromise point and the associated 'antiutopia point', obtained by taking the minimum utilities of the players below the compromise point; it is, thus, a 'converse' KS outcome. The main original condition justifying the classical Kalai-Smorodinsky solution is individual monotonicity: it implies that if the utopia point stays fixed, then the players should benefit from increased availability of favorable outcomes. In defining the KS solution for the case where the disagreement outcome is not exogenous, we thus apply the same logic also to the determination of the disagreement outcome: given that the anti-utopia point does not change, the players should suffer from the increased availability of unfavorable outcomes.
We present two axiomatic characterizations of this solution. In the first one, the crucial axiom is called Independence of Non-Utopia information (INU). This condition is relatively strong and, under an additional condition, says that the compromise and disagreement outcomes in two different problems should be the same if the associated utopia and anti-utopia points coincide. In the second characterization, INU is replaced by three much weaker axioms, including a monotonicity condition.
Another extension of the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution to bargaining problems without fixed disagreement point is proposed in Vartiainen (2002) , but this solution is quite different from our extension.
1
The framework in our paper and in Vartiainen (2007) has resemblance to the one in Thomson (1981) , who also considers bargaining problems without disagreement point. Thus, a bargaining problem is defined merely as a utilitypossibility set. Thomson introduces the notion of reference point as a function of the bargaining problem.
2 The key difference to the classical disagreement point is that no player can unilaterally enforce the reference point. It may thus serve, rather, as a hypothetical outcome to which the players compare proposals made during negotiations. The key difference with our (and Vartiainen's) approach is that we assume that also the reference point (disagreement outcome) is determined by the solution.
In situations where an arbitrator, or a mediator, makes choices for the players (cf. Luce and Raiffa, 1957) , the reference point may also result from a noncooperative, strategic game between the players, and the arbitrator (bargaining solution) assigns a compromise point based on the reference point. Effectively, this way a noncooperative game is turned into a strictly competitive game which may have a value, comparable to a zero-sum game. Such arbitration games have received renewed attention recently, see Kalai and Kalai (2010) .
In Section 2 we present a more detailed discussion of bargaining with endogenous disagreement. In Section 3 we formally introduce the extended KalaiSmorodinsky solution, show that it is non-empty valued and characterize the domain of bargaining problems for which it is single-valued. In Section 4 we present two axiomatic characterizations of the solution on domains where it is single-valued. We also show that the axioms in these characterizations are independent.
All proofs are collected in the Appendix.
Notation For x, y ∈ R 2 , x > y means x i > y i and x y means x i y i for i = 1, 2. Similarly for < and . By [x, y] we denote the line segment with endpoints x and y. The cardinality of a set X ⊆ R 2 is denoted by |X|. For a, x ∈ R 2 , ax := (a 1 x 1 , a 2 x 2 ), aX := {ax | x ∈ X}, and a+X := {a+x | x ∈ X}. The set (−1, −1)X is also denoted by −X. By R 2 + we denote the (strictly) positive quadrant of R 2 . By conv(X) we denote the convex hull of the set X.
Bargaining with endogenous disagreement
A bargaining problem U is a compact and convex subset of R 2 such that x > y for some x, y ∈ U . Elements of U are called outcomes and represent the utilities of two players. By U we denote the set of all bargaining problems.
A classical bargaining problem is a pair (U, d), where U ∈ U and d ∈ U ; the outcome d is called the disagreement outcome, and it results if the players do not reach agreement. By B we denote the set of all classical bargaining problems. A classical bargaining solution is a map F :
In contrast, a bargaining solution or, briefly, a solution is a correspondence f : U → R 2 ×R 2 such that s, r ∈ U and s = r for all U ∈ U and (s, r) ∈ f (U ). For a pair (s, r) ∈ f (U ), we call s the compromise outcome and r the disagreement outcome.
We now discuss how solutions with endogenous disagreement can be interpreted, also offering some perspectives that go beyond Vartiainen (2007) .
3
Classical bargaining theory commonly distinguishes between positive interpretations, according to which bargaining solutions aim to predict the outcome of a bargaining process, and normative interpretations, according to which solutions express a judgment of what outcome would be normatively 'best' or 'fairest' and should therefore be proposed by an arbitrator or mediator if such a person is appointed. Since our extended bargaining solutions return two outcomesa compromise outcome s and a disagreement outcome r -we may classify potential interpretations according to which of the two outcomes are interpreted positively ('players') and which normatively ('mediator'). This yields four possible interpretations overall, see Table 1 . We discuss these cases in turn. In the 'doubly positive' Case 1, s is the predicted compromise outcome of bargaining (without arbitration or mediation), and r the predicted outcome failing agreement. Outcome r plays the role of players' mental reference point, representing their common beliefs of what would happen failing agreement. Both s and r are predicted to emerge as the result of the bargaining process, in the course of which various proposals and threats might have been on the table.
observed in practice. For instance, they correspond to different forms of so-called Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR). Especially in Anglo-Saxon common law systems, ADR has become a wide-spread practice aimed to avoid costly and lengthy court trials through reaching a compromise beforehand. 5 While ADR always assigns a central role to a so-called mediator, the exact nature of this role differs across different forms of ADR. Bargaining theory with endogenous disagreement allows one to study some existing forms of ADR in virtue of the interpretations of Cases 2, 3 and 4. To understand why this is so, two pieces of background information are worth noting. Firstly, the role of the mediator in ADR does typically not consist in elaborating a binding compromise. Instead, any compromise needs both parties' approval. Should this compromise have been proposed by the mediator, this proposal was non-binding. This marks a key difference between ADR and orthodox forms of dispute resolution such as court trials and arbitration; there, the role of the judge resp. arbitrator is precisely to dictate a binding compromise.
6 Secondly, prior to entering ADR both parties have contractually agreed to the mediator's precise role, whatever this role consists in. So, parties cannot later withdraw from the ADR procedure, and any threats or incentives placed by the mediator are credible in the gametheoretic sense. Now we turn to the specific Cases 2, 3 and 4.
In Case 2, the mediator proposes a non-binding compromise s (after listening to both parties, i.e., 'learning' the bargaining problem U at hand). This makes s salient and externally approved. If both players accept s, it is implemented. If the parties do not both accept the proposal and do not reach an alternative compromise, the non-cooperative outcome r is predicted. So, r once again operates as a reference point or 'threat', creating an incentive to accept the proposal s (as long as s > r).
In Case 4, the mediator not just proposes a non-binding compromise, but also underpins this proposal with the threat of forcing a 'bad' binding outcome r on the parties (typically including sanctions or fines) which takes effect in the eventuality that the players neither agree to s nor manage to reach an alternative compromise. This of course presupposes that players have contractually authorized the mediator to dictate a binding disagreement outcome (which players may plausibly do to facilitate a compromise). Once the mediator has announced r, players effectively face an exogenous disagreement outcome. While classical bargaining theory can be used to model bargaining given the mediator's announced r, we also address how r is determined.
Case 3 gives more responsibility to the parties: the mediator does not propose a compromise to the parties but mediates between them to help them find a compromise by themselves. Just as in Case 4, to create an incentive to compro-mise, the mediator imposes a binding outcome r (typically including sanctions or fines) that takes effect if no compromise is reached.
We ultimately leave it to the reader which interpretation to prefer and which applications to focus on. As with bargaining theory in general, the theory with endogenous disagreement captures its intended applications only in a stylized and simplified way. For instance, the model abstracts away certain goals of ADR, such as the goal of inducing a change and ideally a convergence of the parties' preferences. We hope that the connection to ADR will motivate future research and generalizations.
Bargaining problems and the extended KalaiSmorodinsky solution
In this paper we focus on a particular solution, which extends the classical Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution (Raiffa, 1953; Kalai and Smorodinsky, 1975) . For a bargaining problem U ∈ U, the Pareto optimal set is the set P (U ) := {x ∈ U | for all y ∈ U , y x implies y = x} and the anti-Pareto optimal set is the set
The classical Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution assigns to each classical bargaining problem (U, d) the unique point KS(U, d) ∈ P (U ) on the straight line through d and the utopia point
The extended Kalai-Smorodinsky solution is the correspondence k : U → R 2 ×R 2 defined by (s, r) ∈ k(U ) ⇔ s = KS(U, r), r = −KS(−U, −s) and s = r for all U ∈ U and s, r ∈ U . Thus, (s, r) ∈ k(U ) exactly if the following three conditions are satisfied: (i) s = r; (ii) s is the classical Kalai-Smorodinsky outcome when r is viewed as the disagreement outcome; and (iii) r results similarly from s when we reverse the problem or, equivalently, r is the unique point in AP (U ) on the straight line through s and the anti-utopia point
See Figure 1 for an illustration. Our first result is that the extended Kalai-Smorodinsky solution is nonempty valued. The proof is based on an elementary fixed point argument, slightly complicated by the fact that the Pareto and anti-Pareto optimal sets of a bargaining problem U may have one or both endpoints in common. Clearly, in that case, by definition of k -in particular the condition s = r -such an endpoint cannot be the solution outcome. 
We note that k does not have to assign a unique pair of outcomes to a bargaining problem. For instance, let U be the convex hull of the points (6, 0), (8, 0), (0, 6), and (0, 8). Then it is not difficult to check that
In this example the Pareto optimal and anti-Pareto optimal sets are parallel line segments. In fact, a sufficient but not necessary condition for k to assign a unique pair of outcomes to a problem U is that P (U ) and AP (U ) do not contain parallel line segments. Theorem 3.2 below provides an exact description of the class of all bargaining problems on which k is unique. We first introduce some additional terminology. 
See Figure 3 in the Appendix for an illustration. The theorem implies that we do not lose much generality if we restrict attention to domains of bargaining 7 The length of a line segment is the Euclidean distance between its endpoints. problems within D k . We conclude this section with a remark, listing some domains on which k is single-valued. (a) {U ∈ U | U is strictly convex}.
(b) {U ∈ U | AP (U ) or P (U ) contains no line segment}.
(c) {U ∈ U | no line segments S ⊆ AP (U ) and S ′ ⊆ P (U ) are parallel}.
Clearly, the domain in (a) is a subset of the domain in (b), which in turn is a subset of the domain in (c).
Two axiomatic characterizations of the extended Kalai-Smorodinsky solution
In this section we give two axiomatic characterizations of the extended KalaiSmorodinsky solution k on domains on which k is single-valued. In each characterization all axioms except one are basic and shared with the extended Nash solution. In the first characterization the additional axiom is an informational constraint (Independence of Non-Utopia Information), while in the second it is a monotonicity property analogous to such properties used in characterizations of the classical Kalai-Smorodinsky solution. We formulate our conditions for a solution f defined on a domain D ⊆ U with |f (U )| = 1 for all U ∈ D. Instead of f (U ) = {(s, r)} we write f (U ) = (s, r) and regard f as a function rather than a correspondence.
A bargaining problem U ′ ∈ U is a positive affine transformation of a bargaining problem U ∈ U if there are a ∈ R 2 + and b ∈ R 2 such that
2 . The first condition is an extended version of the usual Pareto optimality condition.
Extended Pareto Optimality (EPO): For each
In particular from a normative view point it is natural to require Pareto optimality of the compromise outcome. Requiring anti-Pareto optimality of the disagreement outcome reflects that we wish this outcome to be as severe as possible in order to induce acceptance of the compromise outcome. We now turn to axioms used in only one of our two characterizations. The first characterization is based on an informational restriction which extends and modifies similar conditions used in characterizations of the classical KalaiSmorodinsky solution.
Independence of Non-Utopia Information
This condition says that if f (V ) = (s, r) and we consider a problem U such that s and r are Pareto and anti-Pareto optimal in U and also the associated utopia and anti-utopia points do not change, then the solution does not change: f (U ) = (s, r) as well.
Our second characterization replaces INU by three other axioms, each of which seems normatively defensible and extends classical axioms. The first of these axioms requires that the compromise outcome weakly Pareto dominates the disagreement outcome, i.e., that the disagreement outcome is a threat to both players.
Pareto Dominance (PD): For every U ∈ D, if f (U ) = (s, r) then s r.
The next condition requires that the outcome for any bargaining problem U be unchanged if one removes possible alternatives x from U that are extreme in the sense of giving some individual even less utility than under the original disagreement outcome while giving the other individual even more utility than under the original compromise outcome.
Independence of Extreme Alternatives (IEA): For all U, U
′ ∈ D, writing (s, r) = f (U ), if U ′ ⊆ U and for every x ∈ U \U ′ there is an agent i such that x i < r i and
This condition is a weak version of the condition of IIA (Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives, extended to endogenous disagreement), which underlies the extended Nash bargaining solution. IEA relaxes IIA by restricting it to the case that two sets U and U ′ differ only in 'extreme' alternatives. The final condition is a variant of classical monotonicity conditions. It is well-known from classical bargaining theory that plausible bargaining solutions usually satisfy some but not any kind of monotonicity property. Our monotonicity condition requires that if additional alternatives become available, then, at least under certain extra conditions, the compromise outcome improves weakly and the disagreement outcome worsens weakly for each player. Roughly speaking, the justification is that additional possibilities should give room for better compromise outcomes but also worse disagreement outcomes. In order to formulate the axiom we define, for a bargaining problem U ∈ D, the global utopia point and the global anti-utopia point by
Restricted Monotonicity (RM): For all U, U ′ ∈ D, writing (s, r) = f (U ) and (s ′ , r
, and a(U ′ ) = a(U, s), then s ′ ≥ s and r ′ ≤ r.
Clearly, the conditions on the utopia and global utopia points and the antiutopia and global anti-utopia points considerably restrict this monotonicity condition.
9
The domain D is closed under truncation if whenever it contains U then it also contains every bargaining problem of the form {x ∈ U | α ≤ x i ≤ β} for some i ∈ {1, 2} and α, β ∈ R with a i (U ) α < β u i (U ). The domain D is minimally rich if it is closed under truncation and contains all polytopes in D k .
10 For instance, the whole domain D k and the (small) domain of all polytopes in D k are both minimally rich by Theorem 3.2. (1) For each U ∈ D, write (s, r) := k(U ) and let f 1 (U ) := (t, r), where t is the point in [r, s] which is closest to s subject to U containing at least one of the points (t 1 , a 2 (U, s)) and (a 1 (U, s), t 2 ) (note that possibly t = s). Then f 1 satisfies SYM, SI, PD, IEA, and RM, but not EPO.
(2) Define the solution f 2 in the same way as k but now based on a nonsymmetric version of the KS-solution (cf. Peters and Tijs, 1985) . Such a solution satisfies EPO, SI, PD, IEA, and RM, but not SYM. (4) For each U ∈ U, let (s(U ), r(U )) := k(U ), letŝ(U ) resp.r(U ) be the element of U with first coordinate r 1 (U ) resp. s 1 (U ) and with maximal resp. minimal second coordinate, denote the set of non-extreme outcomes relative to k by U = {x ∈ U | x i s i (U ) or x j r i (U ) for all distinct i, j}, and call U ∈ U essentially symmetric if some positive affine transformation of U is symmetric. For all U ∈ D, define f 4 (U ) as (ŝ(U ),r(U )) if [ŝ(U ) ∈ P (U ),r(U ) ∈ AP (U ) and U is not essentially symmetric], and as k(U ) otherwise. Then f 4 satisfies EPO, SYM, SI, IEA, and RM, but not PD. (6) Let T be the convex hull of (0, 0), (4, 0), (2, 1), and (0, 1).
, where s is the Nash bargaining solution of (U, b), and as k(U ) otherwise. Then f 6 satisfies EPO, SYM, SI, PD, and IEA, but not RM.
Next, we show that the axioms in characterization (b) are tight. We conclude with a few remarks.
Remark 4.2 A partial characterization of the extended Kalai-Smorodinsky solution on the whole domain U is provided in Valkengoed (2006) 11 , at the expense of rather technical conditions. 
A Appendix: proofs
Proof of Theorem 3.1. Let U ∈ U. Then AP (U ) is the graph of a strictly decreasing convex function g on an interval [α, β] with (α, g(α)) and (β, g(β)) the points of AP (U ) with minimal and maximal first coordinates, respectively. If α = β (so that AP (U ) consists of a unique outcome) then {(KS (U, (α, g(α) )), (α, g(α)))} = k(U ) and we are done. From now on we assume α < β. Define the function ϕ : g(α) ). Below, however, we will prove:
There is an ε 1 > 0 with ϕ(γ) > γ for all γ ∈ (α, α + ε 1 ].
(1)
Similarly, if (β, g(β)) ∈ P (U ) we have:
There is an ε 2 > 0 with ϕ(γ) < γ for all γ ∈ [β − ε 2 , β).
Clearly, we can then take ε 1 and ε 2 in (1) and (2) 
Then, since ϕ is continuous, the intermediate value theorem implies that in all cases there is a point γ
Figure 2: Illustrating the proof of (1) We are left to prove (1) and (2). We only show (1), the proof of (2) is analogous. So suppose z := (α, g(α)) ∈ P (U ). See Figure 2 for an illustration of the remainder of the proof.
Let m and ℓ be the supporting lines of U at z as drawn in Figure 2. (That is, m is the limit of supporting lines at P (U ) and ℓ is the limit of supporting lines at AP (U ).) Let µ be the absolute value of the slope of m and let λ be the absolute value of the slope of ℓ. Then λ > µ.
For x ∈ AP (U ) \ P (U ) let σ(x) denote the slope of the straight line through x and u(U, x). Let c[x] denote the line segment with endpoints (x 1 , u 2 (U, x)) and (u 1 (U, x), x 2 ). Then σ(x) is equal to the absolute value of the slope of c [x] . Therefore, σ(x) converges to µ if x ∈ AP (U ) converges to z.
For y ∈ P (U ) \ AP (U ) let τ (y) denote the slope of the straight line through y and a(U, y). Let c[y] denote the line segment with endpoints (y 1 , a 2 (U, y)) and (a 1 (U, y), y 2 ). Then τ (y) is equal to the absolute value of the slope of c [y] . Therefore, τ (y) converges to λ if y ∈ P (U ) converges to z.
We conclude that τ (y) > σ(x) for y ∈ P (U ) and x ∈ AP (U ) close to z. This implies the existence of an ε 1 as in (1).
Proof of Theorem 3.2
For For any x ∈ AP (U ) let σ(x) denote the slope of the straight line through x and u(U, x) (as in the proof of Theorem 3.1). Since σ(x) is equal to the absolute value of the slope of the line segment c[x] connecting the points (x 1 , u 2 (U, x)) and (u 1 (U, x), x 2 ), and the absolute values of these slopes weakly increase if x 1 increases -the line segments c[x] are chords of the weakly decreasing concave function the graph of which contains the Pareto optimal set of U -we have that σ(x) weakly increases if x 1 increases.
( * ) Similarly, for any y ∈ P (U ) let τ (y) denote the slope of the straight line through y and a(U, y) (again as in the proof of Theorem 3.1). Then by an analogous argument τ (y) weakly increases if y 1 decreases.
( * * ) Let (s,r) and (s, r) be the elements of k(U ) with maximal and minimal second coordinates, respectively. By definition of k we have τ (s) = σ(r) for all (s, r) ∈ k(U ). Therefore, by ( * ) and ( * * ) we must have σ(x) = τ (y) for all x ∈ AP (U ) withr 1 x 1 r 1 and all y ∈ P (U ) withs 1 y 1 s 1 . In particular, σ(x) is constant forr 1 x 1 r 1 , which implies that the line segments c[x] for x ∈ [r, r] are parallel; but this means that they must be on the same straight line m throughs and s. Letȳ be the upper endpoint of c[r] and let y be the lower endpoint of c [r] . Then [ȳ, y] ⊆ P (U ),ȳ 1 =r 1 and y 2 = r 2 . See, again, Figure 3 for an illustration. Similarly, let ℓ be the straight line through r and r, then [x, x] ⊆ AP (U ), wherex is the point of ℓ withx 2 =s 2 and x is the point of m with x 1 = s 1 . Now it is straightforward to check that [x, x] and [ȳ, y] satisfy the conditions in the theorem.
Proof of Theorem 4.1.
(1) We first prove that (a) implies (b) and (c). We leave verification of EPO, SYM, SI, INU, PD, and IEA of k on D to the reader. To show RM, consider U, U ′ ∈ D satisfying the antecedent of RM, i.e., U ⊆ U ′ , u(U ′ ) = u(U, r), and a(U ′ ) = a(U, s), where (s, r) := k(U ). Since r < s and U ⊆ U ′ , there are unique pointsr <s in the intersection of the line through r and s with the boundary of U ′ . We show that (s,r) = k(U ′ ), which completes the proof of RM since, clearly,r ≤ r ands ≥ s.
(2) We now prove that (b) implies (a). Suppose f satisfies the four conditions in (b) and let U ∈ D. We have to prove that f (U ) = k(U ). Let k(U ) = (s, r) ∈ P (U ) × AP (U ). Then s > r (this follows from the requirement that there must be x, y ∈ U with x > y). Let V be the convex hull of the six points s, r, (s 1 , a 2 (U, s)), (a 1 (U, s), s 2 ), (u 1 (U, r), r 2 ), and (r 1 , u 2 (U, r)). We will prove that V ∈ D and f (V ) = (s, r). This will conclude the proof of (b) ⇒ (a), since by INU, f (V ) = (s, r) implies f (U ) = (s, r) and, thus, f (U ) = k(U ).
Consider the positive affine transformation
which maps r to (0, 0), s to (1, 1), and V to some set V ′ . Then V ′ is the convex hull of the set
Note that
Thus, V ′ is a symmetric polytope, and it is sufficient to prove that V ′ ∈ D k : for this implies V ∈ D by minimal richness of D; and by SYM and EPO, we have f (V ′ ) = ((1, 1), (0, 0)) and thus, by SI, f (V ) = (s, r). 
We are left to prove that V ′ ∈ D k , i.e., that |k(V ′ )| = 1. Consider Figure 4 with notations as there. For k(V ′ ) to be non-unique there are, in view of Theorem 3.2, two possible cases to examine: (1) a is parallel to d and (2) a is parallel to c. (The cases involving b are analogous.) In case (1) we must have β = 1 − α > 1. Denote the vertical and horizontal distances between a and d by v and h, then the length of a is equal to √ 1 + α 2 whereas √ v 2 + h 2 > β 2 + β 2 > √ 1 + α 2 , so that a does not satisfy condition (ii) in Theorem 3.2. In case (2) we must have β = 2 and α = −1. In particular, AP (V ′ ) is the line segment [(−1, 1), (1, −1)] and P (V ′ ) is the line segment [(0, 2), (2, 0)], so that again condition (ii) in Theorem 3.2 is violated.
(3) We finally prove that (c) implies (a). Suppose f satisfies the six conditions in (b) and let U ∈ D. Let (s, r) := f (U ). We proceed in several steps.
Claim 1. s > r.
To prove this claim, assume the contrary. As s r by PD and s = r by definition of a bargaining solution, we may assume s 1 = r 1 and s 2 > r 2 (the other case is analogous).
Consider first the truncated set U = {x ∈ U | x 2 s 2 }, which is in D by minimal richness. Note that for each x ∈ U \ U we have x 2 > s 2 and hence x 1 < s 1 = r 1 as s ∈ P (U ); so by IEA, f ( U) = f (U ). Next consider the set T = {x ∈ U | x 2 r 2 }, which is again in D by minimal richness. Next, note that for each x ∈ U \ T we have x 2 < r 2 and hence x 1 > r 1 = s 1 as r ∈ AP ( U ); so again by IEA, f (T ) = f ( U ). Altogether we have f (T ) = f (U ) where T = {x ∈ U | r 2 x 2 s 2 }. Moreover, by construction of T , we have u(T, r) = u(T ) and a(T, s) = a(T ).
As T [s, r], we have u(T ) = s or a(T ) = r. Suppose u(T ) = s (the proof is analogous if a(T ) = r). Then, since s ∈ P (T ), u(T ) / ∈ T . Choose α, β ∈ R with a 2 (T ) < α < u 2 (T ) and a 1 (T ) < β < u 1 (T ) such that the set
is a positive affine transformation of a symmetric polytope and such that T ⊆ T ′ . Then T ′ ∈ D as D is minimally rich and
As T ′ is symmetric up to a positive affine transformation, SI and SYM imply that r ′ , s
. This contradiction completes the proof of Claim 1.
To prove this, first observe that, since s > r by Claim 1, U ′ arises from U by a double truncation. Hence, U ′ ∈ D. We next prove that all outcomes in U \ U ′ are extreme alternatives in the sense of IEA. Suppose that x ∈ U with x 1 < r 1 . Suppose x 2 s 2 . Since r < s, we have x < s, hence x a(U, s). Also, x < u(U, r) since s u(U, r). Thus, x ∈ U ′ . Hence, if x ∈ U \ U ′ then x 1 < r 1 implies x 2 > s 2 . Similarly, x ∈ U \ U ′ and x 2 < r 2 imply x 1 > s 1 . Suppose now x ∈ U and x r. Then x u(U, r) and since r < s, whence r a(U, s), we have x a(U, s), so that x ∈ U ′ . Altogether we have proved that the antecedent of IEA holds for U ′ ⊆ U , so that f (U ′ ) = (s, r).
In view of Claim 2 and the definition of k it is sufficient to prove that f (U ′ ) = k(U ′ ). In view of SI of f and k we may assume that a(U ′ , s) = (0, 0) and u(U ′ , r) = (1, 1). Denote L = [(0, 0), (1, 1)] and U 0 = {x ∈ R 2 | (0, 0) x (1, 1)}. If r, s ∈ L then clearly k(U ′ ) = (s, r) = f (U ′ ) and we are done. Otherwise, without loss of generality s / ∈ L. We proceed by choosingŝ,r ∈ L as follows. If r / ∈ L then chooseŝ,r such that: (i)ŝ s,r r; (ii) there is a line ℓ throughŝ intersecting the boundary of U 0 at points (α, 1) and (1, β) such thatr 1 < α < 1,r 2 < β < 1 and such that the set U ′ is weakly below ℓ; (iii) there is a line m, not parallel to ℓ, throughr intersecting the boundary of U 0 at points (0, γ) and (δ, 0) such that 0 < γ <ŝ 2 , 0 < δ <ŝ 1 and such that the set U ′ is weakly above m. 12 See Figure 5 for an illustration. If r ∈ L then we still 12 The first candidates forŝ andr are the points s ′ and r ′ , where s ′ is the point of intersection of L and P (U ′ ) and r ′ is the point of intersection of L and AP (U ′ ); and for ℓ and m the lines through s ′ and r ′ supporting U ′ . If those lines happen to be parallel, or if one or more of the numbers α, β, γ, and δ do not satisfy the desired constraints, one can takeŝ = s ′ + (ε, ε) and/orr = r ′ − (ε ′ , ε ′ ), where 0 < ε, ε ′ are sufficiently small, and shift up and if necessary slightly rotate ℓ and/or m. Claim 3. f (V ) ∈ {x ∈ V : x ≥ s} × {x ∈ V : x ≤ r}. The claim follows from RM and Claim 2, noting that U ′ ⊆ V and that u(V ) = u(U ′ , r) (= (1, 1)) and a(V ) = a(U ′ , s) (= (0, 0)).
Let W be the convex hull of the pointsŝ,r, (ŝ 1 , 0), (1,r 2 ), (0,ŝ 2 ), and (r 1 , 1).
Claim 4. W ∈ D and f (W ) = (ŝ,r). That W ∈ D, in particular that W ∈ D k , follows by the same argument as used in the last part of (2) above. Since W is symmetric, EPO and SYM imply f (W ) = (ŝ,r).
Claim 5. f (V ) = (ŝ,r).
To prove this, we note that by construction of V and W we have (1, 1) = u(V ) = u(W,r) and (0, 0) = a(V ) = a(W,ŝ). Since W ⊆ V , the claim follows from RM and Claim 4.
We can now complete the proof of part (3) and the theorem. Claim 5, Claim 3, and the definition ofŝ andr imply that we must have s, r ∈ L since otherwise we obtain a contradiction. But in that case we have (s, r) = k(U ′ ) = f (U ′ ).
